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Will Fox Change Chiapas? Not Unless
Trade Partners Understand the Real
Issues
Kimberly Olson
On January 1, 1994, Mexico officially adopted the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 1 While the
President of Mexico celebrated with fellow leaders of the
country, a group called the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion
Nacional (EZLN), or Zapatistas, followed through with a plan
years in the making.2 Led by a man who calls himself
Subcomandante Marcos, the Zapatistas took control of four
Mexican cities to let the world know that they were serious
about the neglect they felt as citizens of a poor, rural Mexican
state.3 The state was Chiapas, and this conflict still exists. 4 The
Zapatistas and their supporters have not had their concerns
addressed and, until recently, the uprising seemed to have hit a
point of stagnation.
With the recent changes in Mexico's government, the
Zapatistas and Chiapas are in the news again. For seventy
years, Mexico had a Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI)
party President,5 but on December 1, 2000, Vincente Fox, of the
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Mex.-Can.,
reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 289 and 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]; see also
Jorge A. Vargas, NAFTA, The Chiapas Rebellion, and the Emergence of Mexican
Ethnic Law, 25 CAL. W. INVL L.J. 1, 1 (1994).
2. See Andy Gutierrez, Codifying the Past, Erasing the Future: NAFTA and
the Zapatista Uprising of 1994, 4 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POLY 143, 153
(1998).
3. See id. at 144.
4. See generally Clash in Chiapas Injures Four, THE INDEPENDENT (London),
Aug. 24, 2000, at 14 (describing a recent confrontation between Zapatistas and PRI
party supporters).
5. See Revolution Ends, Change Begins: A Survey of Mexico After the
Revolution, ECONOMIST, Oct. 28, 2000, at 1, 3. Historically, the PRI has purported to
represent the interests of workers and peasants, but it lost a lot of support amidst
reports of corruption, bribery, and involvement in the drug trade. See Gerardo
Nebbia & Patrick Martin, Mexico After the Elections, at http: / /www.wsws.org/
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Partido Accion Nacional (PAN) party, became the leader of
Mexico.6 President Fox stated that he could end the conflict
surrounding Chiapas,7 and he took steps toward fulfilling that
promise when he scheduled negotiations with the Zapatistas
shortly after taking office.8 Although an end to the tension in
that state would be welcome, there are skeptics of his agenda.9
Leaders have made similar promises in the past, and the discord
remains. 10
Part I of this article examines the issues leading to the
uprising in Chiapas. It then describes the actual uprising, and
the attempts at resolution that have followed, including
President Fox's election. Part II looks at how Fox may, or may
not, change the strife in that state. Although Mexico has seen a
dramatic change at the helm, this section argues that
meaningful change will not reach Chiapas without a push from
those who seem to matter most to Fox - his trade partners. For
real change to take place, Mexico's trade partners need to
understand what is really ailing this troubled state.
I. ORIGINS AND HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT IN
CHIAPAS
Mexico's political situation has always been anything but
stagnant. This volatility has been particularly prevalent in the
state of Chiapas where conflicts over land rights, access to
resources, and economic growth have persisted over the last
century. This section examines the history of the conflict over
land and their impact on life in the region, recent attempts by
articles/2000/ju2000 (last visited July 22, 2000).
6. See Nebbia & Martin, supra note 5. President Fox is considered to have
more open views than other members of the PAN party, historically known for being
homophobic, against women's rights, and in favor of censorship. See id.; Carlos
Fuentes, We All Won, EL PAIS, July 4, 2000, reprinted in WORLD PRESS REV., Sept.
2000, at 7. In addition to the PRI and PAN parties, there is also a Partido
Revolucionario Democratico (PRD) party in Mexico, which is considered the "left"
party of the country. See Nebbia & Martin, supra note 5.
7. See Peter Fritsch, Chiapas Election Could Spur Talks With Guerrillas,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2000, at All.
8. See Tim Weiner, Mexico's New Leader Swiftly Seeks Peace in Chiapas, N.Y.
TIMEs ON THE WEB, at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/04/world/04MEXI.html
(Dec. 4, 2000). Subcommandante Marcos remains skeptical of Fox's promises of
resolution. See Mexico's President Orders Troops Out of Zapatista Rebel Areas,
MPLS. STAR TRIB, Dec. 3, 2000, at A6.
9. See Fritsch, supra note 7.
10. See infra Part I.B.2 (discussing the unsuccessful attempts at resolution).
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the Mexican government to resolve these conflicts, and
international involvement in the search for a solution.
A. LAND RIGHTS IN CHIAPAS
Chiapas is the southernmost state in Mexico. It is rich in
natural resources,1 ' including oil, currently an extremely
valuable resource across the world.12 Its farms also produce
cocoa, beef, sugar, coffee, corn, and beans.13 In addition, Chiapas
has hydroelectric dams that are a major source of power for the
country. 14 While Chiapas appears to have the means for its
citizens to be economically self-supporting, corruption and
disinterested government officials 15 have made this state the
poorest in the country. 16
As of 1990, the population of Chiapas was just over
3,200,000.17 About twenty-four percent of these people were
indigenous, and nearly seventy-four percent of them were living
in rural areas.' 8 Only about seventy percent of the homes in
Chiapas had electricity and fewer than fifty-nine percent had
running water just ten years ago. 19 The majority of the Chiapan
11. See Lewis Dolinsky, Chiapas Awaits the Fox Era, S.F. CHRON., July 12,
2000, at A8.
12. See Clinton and Greenspan Express Concern Over High Crude Oil Prices;
Mexico and Venezuela Call For Production Increases, MIDDLE E. ECON. SUR., at
http://www.mees.com/backissues/volume43/v43nO8aO2.htm (Feb. 21, 2000)
(explaining that crude oil prices reached an all time high of $30 a barrel in the
beginning of February, 2000).
13. See Vargas, supra note 1, at 9, 13.
14. See id. at 9.
15. See generally Revolution Ends, supra note 5, at 4 (explaining that PRI
leaders obtained support through money). The tradition of government officials
building "white elephants" provides a telling example of the corruption and
disinterest that takes place in Mexico. See Sam Quinones, Chiapas Entering A New
Era, S.F. EXAMINER, Oct. 8, 2000, at A21. Elefantes blancos, or white elephants, are
public works projects built by leaders at enormous cost, while the citizens of the area
continue to live in poverty. See id. Citizens typically stood by and watched as these
grand projects were built, but recently some Chiapans protested and halted the
construction of a cathedral plaza that was being built in San Cristobal de Las Casas.
See id.
16. See Vargas, supra note 1, at 10.
17. See MICHAEL E. CONROY & SARAH ELIZABETH WEST, The Impact of NAFTA
and the WTO on Chiapas and Southern Mexico, POVERTY OR DEVELOPMENT 43
(Richard Tardanico & Mark B. Rosenberg eds., 2000). In 1998, the population of
Chiapas was approximately 3,900,000. See North is North and South is South: A
Survey of Mexico After the Revolution, ECONOMIST, Oct. 28, 2000, at 10.
18. See CONROY & WEST, supra note 17, at 43.
19. See id. at 45.
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citizens earn less than seven dollars a day20 and eighty percent
of the population lives in extreme poverty.21 There are few
schools for Chiapan children to attend, and when they do have
access to a school and a teacher they have trouble learning
because they are weak from hunger.22
The root of the problems ailing Chiapas centers on land
rights. For centuries, a trend has occurred throughout Chiapas
that contributes to their struggles. The wealthiest people of the
state (who happen to almost unanimously support the long-
ruling PRI party) take land from the indigenous people and
force them to move further and further into hilly lands not
suited for agriculture. 23 The state of Chiapas revolted in 1910 as
a result of this land dispossession. 24
The government first enacted Article 27 of the Mexican
Constitution25  after the revolution in 191026 to address
indigenous peoples' concerns about land and water rights.27
Prior to the revolution, eighty-seven percent of the rural land in
Mexico belonged to just two thousand families.2 Under Article
27, rural communities received ejidos29 to more evenly distribute
land.30 An ejido is a small piece of land that is farmed by
20. See Vargas, supra note 1, at 8.
21. See Quinones, supra note 15.
22. See FIRST WORLD, HA HA HA!: THE ZAPATISTA CHALLENGE 61 (Elaine
Katazenberger ed., 1995).
23. See id. at 64.
24. See Vargas, supra note 1, at 2 n.12.
25. Article 27, as it was originally adopted, addressed land and water rights
thoughout. For example, section X declares that,
Centers of population which lack communal lands (ejidos) or which are
unable to have them restored to them due to lack of titles, impossibility of
identification, or because they had been legally transferred, shall be
granted sufficient lands and waters.., not less than ten hectares of moist
or irrigated land...."
CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LOS EsTADOs UNIDOS MEICANOS, art. 27 (amended
1966).
26. Article 27 first appeared in the 1917 Mexican Constitution. See Vargas,
supra note 1, at 2 n.12.
27. See id. The Zapatistas adopted the name ofEmiliano Zapata, a leader who
fought for land rights in the 1910 revolution. See James J. Kelly, Jr., Article 27 and
Mexican Land Reform: The Legacy of Zapata's Dream, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV.
541, 541 (1994).
28. See If Not for NAFTA, When?: A Survey of Mexico After the Revolution,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 28, 2000, at 7.
29. See Vargas, supra note 1, at 13.
30. See generally June Nash, The Challenge of Trade Liberalization to Cultural
Survival on the Southern Frontier of Mexico, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 367, 367
(1994) (discussing creation of communal plantations). Article 27 was also known as
the Land Reform Act. See id.
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campesinos, or peasants. 31 The campesinos collectively have
rights to the land and decisions regarding its use are made
based on what the majority desires.32 The people of Chiapas
used the land primarily for subsistence farming of vegetables,
which mainly included corn and beans.33 In 1988, there were
over three million families living on the 28,000 ejidos created by
Article 27. 34
Unfortunately for the people of Chiapas, in 1992 the
Mexican government erased ninety years of expectations and
legally recognized rights to help gain U.S. and Canadian
approval and secure the passage of NAFTA. 35 President Salinas,
the leading proponent of NAFTA in Mexico, initiated an
amendment to Article 27 to abolish ejidos and encourage
latifundios, which would change the nature of land rights
throughout the country. 36  The legislature passed this
amendment and all thirty-one states approved the change less
than two months after it was first suggested.37 It washed away
land rights of the campesinos,38 allowing the land to be sold.39
One justification for the new Article was that small, communal
farms could not keep up with Mexico's increasing demands for
food, thereby forcing the country to import grains and beans.40
31. See Vargas, supra note 1, at 13 n.80.
32. See If Not for NAFTA, When?, supra note 28, at 8.
33. See Vargas, supra note 1, at 13. In 1994, ninety percent of the income
generated in Chiapas came from agriculture, which consisted primarily of corn,
beans, sugarcane and coffee. See CONROY & WEST, supra note 17, at 49.
34. See Kelly, Jr., supra note 27, at 543.
35. See Kelly Jr., supra note 27 and accompanying text.
36. See Vargas, supra note 1, at 13. Latifundios are a different type of land
ownership "designed for export economy-mass production." Id. This system was
adopted to "encourage U.S.-style agri-business." Id.
37. See Gutierrez, supra note 2, at 152. This type of extreme political change
initiated by the President led some to call Mexico the "perfect dictatorship." Id.
There process lacked community input, hearings, or other ways to involve the
general public in either the Article 27 amendment or the passage of NAFTA, yet
both may lead to the displacement of millions. See id. at 161.
38. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (defining the word campesino).
Several sections of Article 27 were repealed, including section X of the Mexican
Constitution, which gave ejido land. Compare CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LOS
ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS, art. 27 (amended 1966), with CONSTITUCION POLITICA
DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS, art. 27 (amended 1996).
39. See WORTH H. WELLER, CONFLICT IN CHIAPAS: UNDERSTANDING THE
MODERN MAYAN WORLD 66 (2000).
40. See Kelly, Jr., supra note 27, at 543 (explaining that food production could
not keep up with population growth within the country). But see Nash, supra note
30, at 373 (explaining that ethnologists believe the Chiapans could produce more if
they had access to fertilizer and weed killers).
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Some felt that a change was necessary to encourage agricultural
growth.41 Others argue that the government enacted amended
Article 27 in preparation for NAFTA because erasing rights to
ejidos created an opportunity for privatization, and allowed
corporations to gain property rights in an area rich with natural
resources.
42
Non-campesinos quickly moved into the area to search for
oil 43 and to establish hydroelectric dams that supply Mexico
with the majority of its power." The Agrarian Solicitor's Office
in Mexico claimed that in the year following the amendment, no
forced sales took place in Chiapas as a result of the amendment
to Article 27. 45 The PRI government, however, with its
reputation for being sinister, 46 has been known to misstate the
truth to create an image of stability.47
The Article 27 amendments and changes in land policy
gravely affected the people of Chiapas. The PRI and its
supporters had already been the pushing Chiapans off of the
best farming land for years. 48 Now Chiapans were forced from
their land without compensation. 49 This forced them onto land
less suited for farming, leaving those driving them from the land
to reap its benefits.50 Because the Chiapans are forced onto land
less suited for agriculture, they cannot produce as much food for
41. See Kelly, Jr., supra note 27, at 543-44.
42. See id. at 544. These corporations may be from the United States or
Canada, as NAFTA has reduced trade barriers. See id. But see Michael W. Goldman
et al., An Introduction to Direct Foreign Investment in Mexico, 5 IND. INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 101, 125 (1994) (suggesting that Mexico may lose foreign trade opportunities
if the Mexican people and resources are not treated properly).
43. In 1938 Mexico nationalized its oil companies by creating Pemex, but in
1995 Mexico limited exclusive government control. As a result, the door was opened
for private and foreign companies to potentially move in. See JUAN M. QUINTANILLA
& MARIANo E. BAUER, Mexico Oil and Energy, in CHANGING STRUCTURE OF MEXICO:
POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 111-12 (Laura Randall ed., 1996).
44. See Nash, supra note 30, at 372.
45. See id. at 379.
46. See Philippe Boulet-Gercourt, Mexico's Historic Overturn, LE NOUVEL
OBSERVATEUR (LEFTIST WEEKLY) (Paris), July 6, 2000, reprinted in WORLD PRESS
REV., Sept. 2000, at 7.
47. See generally Sarah C. Aird, The War of Attrition in Chiapas, 7 HUM. RTS.
BR. 24, 24 (2000) (describing claims that Mexico misstated its stability to assure the
passage of NAFTA); Elizabeth Fullerton, Mexico's Military Caught in the Tide of
Change, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Canada), Oct. 3, 2000, at A14 (claiming that
Mexican officials have misstated the number of military personnel in Chiapas).
48. See FIRST WORLD HA HA HA!, supra note 22.
49. See Nash, supra note 30, at 372.
50. See id.
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their own use and sale.51 The same government watched the
Chiapans get pushed onto this infertile land and then justified
the campesinos' loss of constitutional rights by pointing to
farmers' decreased output.5 2 The domino effect has continued, as
a vast majority of the Chiapan citizens live in extreme poverty,53
and do not have access to running water, electricity, medicine,
or other basic things that many take for granted.54
The removal of Chiapans from their land has had a ripple
effect throughout Mexico. When people in Chiapas, and
elsewhere, are forcibly removed, they are driven to bigger cities
in Mexico and to the United States. 55 The Chiapans are also
being driven into the Lacandon rainforest because of these land
takeovers, and are then blamed for its degradation.56 If the
cities in Mexico do not have enough opportunities, Chiapans will
likely be forced to immigrate to the United States and either go
through a process to become legal immigrants or face the risks
associated with illegal immigration.57
B. THE UPRISING IN CHIAPAS
During the past ten years, a number of dissatisfied
residents of Chiapas organized and participated in uprisings
against the Mexican government. Those who organized and
participated in the uprising named their movement Ejercito
Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (Zapatista National Liberation
Army, or EZLN).58 Not all Chiapans who support the Zapatista's
quest for indigenous land rights are part of the EZLN, but many
took the opportunity of the attention created by the Zapatistas
to express their desire for changes in land rights.59 The ELZN-
51. In addition, the people in Chiapas have no money to buy fertilizer and weed
killers that would aid in increased production. See Nash, supra note 30.
52. See Kelly Jr., supra note 40 and accompanying text.
53. See Quinones, supra note 21 and accompanying text.
54. See CONROY & WEST, supra note 19 and accompanying text.
55. See Kelly, Jr., supra note 27, at 544. But see George Zabolski, Mexican
President-Elect Concludes Tour of North America, OKLA. DAILY, Aug. 29, 2000
(declaring that as trade barriers are lessened, the people of Mexico export goods to
more consumers, resulting in increased wealth and the disappearance of illegal
immigration to the United States); Goldman et al., supra note 42, at 121 (claiming
that NAFTA would "foster economic growth, discourage immigration into the United
States, and create wealth...").
56. See Nash, supra note 30, at 368-69.
57. See generally Anthony DePalma, Legal or Not, U.S. Farmers Must Rely on
Migrant Workers, MPLS-STAR TRIB., Oct. 8, 2000, at A32.
58. See Vargas, supra note 1, at 2.
59. See Kelly, Jr., supra note 27, at 569.
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organized uprisings have contributed to continued unrest in
Chiapas. An understanding of the region's historic unrest is
essential to understanding the problems facing President Fox.
1. The Initial Revolt
On January 1, 1994, the EZLN responded to the Mexican
government's continued apathy toward the issues important to
the EZLN.60 The uprising began with the Zapatistas entering
the cities of San Cristobal de Las Casas, Ocosingo, A Itamirano,
and Las Margaritas. 61 They easily took control of the towns, but
hours later the Mexican military arrived to put an abrupt end to
the Zapatistas' success.62 The Zapatistas attempted to escape to
the Lacandon rainforest, but some did not make it and suffered
at the hands of the Mexican Army.63 The EZLN did not have the
modern equipment necessary to fight against a military trained
and supplied by the United States. 64
This uprising occurred on the same day Mexico formally
adopted NAFTA, and some feel this timing was not accidental. 65
The Chiapans suffered as trade barriers were lowered because
they faced increased competition from larger, better-equipped
farms.66 They felt that their own country ignored their concerns
60. See Gutierrez, supra note 2, at 143-44.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 144.
63. See id. When reporters were let into one area of attack, they found bodies
on the streets and signs of execution style killings. See id.
64. See id. There are reports that the EZLN had wood carved in the shape of
guns with metal or knives attached to the "barrel" to create bayonets. See id. In
contrast, the Mexican military had U.S.-made Humvees, U.S. helicopter gunships,
and German G-3 automatic rifles. See Vargas, supra note 1, at 3. The United States
claims it trained the military to remedy drug traffic problems, but it has been
acknowledged that the skills taught could be used in other contexts. See Conflict
Resolution: Chiapas, Mexico and the Search for Peace, Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on The Western Hemisphere of the House of Representatives Comm. on
International Relations, 105th Cong. 13 (1998) (statements of Joel Soloman,
Research Director For the Americas Human Rights Watch and Congressman Roy
Blunt).
65. See WELLER, supra note 39, at 63. Subcomandante Marcos claims the date
was postponed three times because the Zapatistas were not prepared and various
holidays interfered. According to Marcos, the first date that worked was January 1,
1994. See FIRST WORLD, HA HA HA!, supra note 22, at 66-67.
66. See Gutierrez, supra note 2, at 145. It was estimated that seventy-eight
percent of ejidos produced corn and that they felt the negative impact of NAFTA. See
id. With fewer trade restrictions, the campesinos face competition from "the world's
most advanced, and highly subsidized, corn-producing nation in the world, the
United States." Id.
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and instead expended energy assuring foreign investors there
was no problem.67 To ensure the passage of NAFTA, the
Mexican government's main priority was preserving an image of
political and economic stability. 6
8
The Zapatistas, like others, predicted that NAFTA would
only magnify the problems of Chiapans. These problems
centered on land rights, including forced migration due to oil,
hydroelectric dams, tourism, and logging industries.69 Marcos,
the Zapatista leader, had a more dire prediction of what NAFTA
would do to the Chiapans saying: "Did the American people
know that, in signing NAFTA, their government had become an
accomplice in genocide ... that the indigenous people of Mexico
were now condemned to death?"70
NAFTA did contain Supplemental Side Accords (SSAs),
which were praised in international trade law as being the first
such trade agreement to substantively address human rights
issues. 71 Under these Side Accords, parties to NAFTA must
meet obligations set out in the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation 72  and the North American
Agreement on Labor Organization. 3 These SSAs impose
monetary sanctions for the violation of environmental, labor,
and health law,'7 4 but they do not address the land issues that
trouble the Chiapans. 75
2. Attempts to Resolve the Conflict: Negotiations and Agreements
The Zapatistas and the Mexican government agreed to a
cease-fire on January 12, 1994 and negotiations began.76 The
67. See generally Aird, supra note 47.
68. See Vargas, supra note 1, at 15. Some have suggested that the Mexican
government continues to downplay the situation of Chiapas to provide assurance to
foreign investors that Mexico is a politically stable nation. See Aird, supra note 47 at
24; Adios to Mexico's President Zedillo, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 10, 2000, at 22.
69. See Nash, supra note 30, at 393-94.
70. Gutierrez, supra note 2, at 143 (citing Subcomandante Marcos, What Do the
American People Fear? Our Bare Feet and Broken Bodies?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1995,
at editorial at M2).
71. See id., at 145.
72. See North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-Mex.-
Can., Part II, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1483 (1993).
73. See North American Agreement on Labor Organization, U.S.-Mex.-Can.,
Part II, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1503 (1993).
74. See id. at Part V, Article 41, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1512 (1993).
75. See Gutierrez, supra note 2, at 145.
76. See Alejandro Nadal, Terror in Chiapas, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS,
Mar./Apr. 1998, at 19-20.
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Zapatistas submitted thirty-four specific "Demands and
Engagements to Achieve a Dignified Peace in Chiapas" to the
federal government in their initial attempt to reach an
agreement.7 7 These demands included: a revision of NAFTA to
incorporate their interests, an amendment to Article 27, food for
Chiapan children, hospitals, electricity, and drinking water.78
The Mexican government responded to each demand, and on
March 2, 1994, reached a temporary resolution. 79 Some
Zapatista supporters criticized the compromise as loosely
defined and nothing more than a move by the government to
buy time.80 These skeptics turned out to be correct, as the
government never met the demands of the Chiapans.
In December of 1994, President Zedillo succeeded President
Salinas as the new leader of Mexico.8' Soon after he took over, a
large-scale military attack was launched against the Zapatistas,
a move that drew criticism from other countries.8 2 In March of
1995, the Congress of the Union responded to these attacks by
unanimously approving the Law for Dialogue, Conciliation and
Peace with Dignity in Chiapas.8' The Mexican government
agreed to take steps to achieve peace and resolve the problems
in Chiapas,8 4 but despite these efforts, the conflict continued.
On February 16, 1996, the two sides signed the San Andres
Accords. 85 Intended to achieve peace and address the concerns of
the Chiapans, they did not become law due to differing opinions
regarding the extent of autonomy that should be provided to
indigenous Mexican communities.86 The agreements provided
77. See Vargas, supra note 1, at 4.
78. See id. at 5.
79. See id. at 4. The short-lived agreement was reached with help from Catholic
Bishop Samuel Ruiz who acted as mediator. See id. A series of political changes led
to a switch in the government official negotiating with the Zapatistas, and the EZLN
did not accept new government proposals. See id. at 6.
80. See id. at 4.
81. See Nadal, supra note 76.
82. See id.
83. See Diodoro Carrasco Altamirano, Secretary of the Interior, Open Letter to
the EZLN, Chiapas Special Coverage, at http://world.presidencia.gob.mx/chiapas/
document/htm (last visited Sept. 7, 1999).
84. See id.
85. See Jo Tuckman, Zapatistas Wait For Proof of New Mexican Order: Chiapas
Rebels Remain Wary of the Politicians Replacing the Old Guard, THE GUARDIAN
(London), Aug. 24, 2000, at 16.
86. See Conflict Resolution, supra note 64, at 5 (statement of Carlos Tello Diaz,
Independent Mexican Scholar). The points of disagreement involved the removal of
some military troops in the area and the right of the indigenous to establish their
own form of voting. See Dolinsky, supra note 11.
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for changes in national legislation, the Mexican Constitution,
and the power of local governments.87 Specifically, if adopted,
the San Andres Accords would gradually allow indigenous areas
to have more control over government funds allocated to them,
and increased indigenous involvement in government decisions
directly affecting these people."" In addition, the San Andres
Accords called for constitutional amendments giving indigenous
people their land and natural resources back.89
Due to the failed negotiations, hostility has continued in
this southern Mexican state with no resolution. In December
1997, Zapatista supporters were praying in a Chiapas village
when forty-five of them were killed.90 It is suspected that the
gunmen were PRI supporters. 91 In response, the Mexican
government again expressed its willingness to take steps to
resolve this ongoing conflict.92 Finally, in 1999, Mexican leaders
asked the Senate of the Republic to consider changes to the
Mexican Constitution that would provide for indigenous rights
and culture.93 It was suggested that this reform not only provide
for future rights, but also provide a remedy for those hurt in
past Chiapas conflicts. 94 Again, no real change occurred.
Negotiations have occurred on and off for over seven years,
but something more needs to be done to end this struggle as
there are no signs that the conflict will go away quietly with
time.95 The Zapatistas and PRI party supporters were recently
involved in a confrontation that resulted in four injuries, and
this is not an isolated or uncommon occurrence.9 6
3. The Uprising's Impact: Environmental Harms and Human
Rights Concerns
Since the Zapatista uprising, the government has spent a
87. See Jeffrey N. Gesell, Customary Indigenous Law In the Mexican Juridical
System, 26 GA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 643, 644 (1998).
88. See San Andres Accords, January 18, 1996, II.4 (Rosalva Bermudez-Ballin,
trans.).
89. See San Andres Accords, January 18, 1996, V.1 (Rosalva Bermudez-Ballin,
trans.).
90. See Gesell, supra note 87, at 645.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See Altamirano, supra note 83.
94. See id.
95. See CONROY & WEST, supra note 17, at 52.
96. See Clash in Chiapas Injures Four, THE INDEP. (London), Aug. 24, 2000, at
14.
2001]
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
significant amount of money keeping the military in Chiapas.97
This excess military involvement injures Chiapas in several
ways. Military personnel have brought many unwanted
problems to this area. They have introduced disease, trash, and
farming methods that are detrimental to Chiapans in both the
long and short term.98 Disease is especially life threatening as
this area has limited access to medical supplies.9 The trash,
deforestation, and genetically altered seeds also mean that in
the long term the Chiapan land will be less productive. 100
Both human rights and environmental abuses have
continued past the initial days of the Zapatista uprising. Many
environmental problems can be linked to the military's
continued presence in the region. 101 Although President Fox did
order some troops out of areas in Chiapas shortly after taking
office, 10 2 the military continues to occupy this state.10 3 Since
their arrival, they have introduced poisonous insecticides, cut
down trees in the Montes Azules Biosphere Reserve10 4 to create
roads and military camps, produced a significant amount of
trash, and threatened the citizens of the state.105
Moreover, the continued military presence in Chiapas
creates a substantial economic strain on the region. It costs
money to keep 40,000 troops in an area that is arguably not a
threat. 1°6 This money would be better spent on getting
essentials into the area, which would be a step in the right
direction toward solving the conflict altogether. The
97. See Fullerton, infra note 103 and accompanying text.
98. See Mercedes Osun, Zapatista Report, Z Magazine, (Irlandesa trans.),
http:I/ www.zmag.org/ZMag/articles/decl999osun.html (Sept. 1, 2000).
99. See generally Quinones, supra note 21 and accompanying text (describing
the extreme poverty in Chiapas).
100. See Osun, supra note 105 and accompanying text.
101. See Jo Tuckman, Peasants to Fight 'Political' Eviction, THE GUARDIAN
(London), Sept. 2, 2000, at 17.
102. See Mexico's President Orders Troops Out of Zapatista Rebel Areas, supra
note 8, at A6.
103. Prior to President Fox ordering some troops out of the area, the Mexican
government reported that just under 20,000 soldiers occupied Chiapas, but human
rights organizations estimated the number to be closer to 40,000. See Fullerton,
supra note 47 at A14.
104. The Montes Azules Biospheric Reserve is considered Mexico's most
important tropical rainforest, covering 827,000 acres in Chiapas. The area has both
fertile soil and oil, and environmentalists fear that it is on the brink of ecological
disaster if people continue to settle on the land. See Tuckman, supra note 101, at 17.
105. See Osun, supra note 98 and accompanying text; FIRST WORLD, HA HA HA!,
supra note 22, at 58.
106. See Fullerton, supra note 103 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 10:2
WILL Fox CHANGE CHIAPAS?
unnecessary military involvement may also pose a legal
problem, as some allege that Mexican leaders are violating
Article 129 of their Constitution. 10 7 This provision limits
military involvement to areas directly related to some military
action, and it prohibits permanent bases from being established
in populated areas. 08
Similarly, human rights violations have continued since the
first days of the uprising. Amnesty International reports a
significant increase in torture, 0 9 disappearances, illegal arrests,
and massacres since the revolt in Chiapas." 0  Amnesty
International accused authorities in Mexico of ignoring human
rights standards in its own laws and international treaties."'
Moreover, Mexico may be violating both U.S. and international
law in their handling of this conflict." 2 The United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights visited the area in late
1999 because of reports of frequent abuse." 3
107. See Chiapas, Mexico and the Zapatista Rebellion, http://www.geocities.coml
capitalhill/1364/cpagel.html (last modified Dec. 2000). This Article of the
Constitution says that "in time of peace, no military authority may exercise more
functions than those that have an exact connection with military discipline."
CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS, art. 129 (amended
1996), supra note 111.
108. See CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS, art. 129
(amended 1996).
109. According to Amnesty International, the most frequent modes of torture
include electric shocks, semi-asphyxiation by suffocation or drowning, beatings, and
rape. See Linda Diebel, Amnesty Report Slams Mexico Over Rights Abuse, TORONTO
STAR, Mar. 8, 1999, available at 1999 WL 14314841.
110. See id.
111. See id. President Zedillo, who was the leader in Mexico until Fox took over
on December 1, 2000, has been accused of violating several Mexican laws, including
Articles 29 and 129 of the Mexican Constitution. See Chiapas, Mexico and the
Zapatista Rebellion, supra note 107 at http://www.geocities.com/capitalhill/1364/
cpagel.html. Article 29 addresses the authority of Mexican officials to act if society is
in danger or the public peace is disturbed. See CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LOS
ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS, art. 29 (amended 1996). Article 129 provides that the
military will not exercise authority beyond military functions and will not establish
permanent military commands in populated areas. See CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE
LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS, art. 129 (amended 1996).
112. See Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (2000) (explaining that the
United States will promote human rights by discontinuing security assistance for
countries showing a pattern of international human rights violations); Alien Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988) (creating jurisdiction for torts committed around
the world against aliens in violation of the law of nations). See, e.g., Bigio v. Coca
Cola Co., No. 98-9058, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 31306, at 17 (2d Cir. Dec. 7, 2000)
(citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir. 1995)). The Alien Tort Claims
Act has been held to apply to war crimes including murder, rape, and torture. See id.
113. See U.N. Human Rights Commissioner Visits Mexico, DEUTSCH PRESSE-
AGENTUR, Nov. 24, 1999.
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4. International Attempts to Resolve the Conflict
Although human rights organizations criticize Mexico's
handling of Chiapas, the Mexican government has been
reluctant to let outsiders get involved in the issues surrounding
this area.114 United States Secretary of State Madeline Albright
claims that the United States has encouraged Mexico to solve
the conflict, but Mexican leaders have maintained that they will
not be pressured.115 In fact, after talks with the United States on
unrelated matters, the Mexican Foreign Secretariat quickly
reported to his country that there was no discussion of Chiapas
between the two countries. 1 6 When questioned, the response
was that President Zedillo felt the situation only concerned
Mexicans and thus was not open to outside suggestions."17
The United States held several congressional hearings to
specifically address this issue."" While Senators and
Representatives invited both people living in Chiapas and
Mexican scholars to speak on the human rights abuses and land
rights issues, the primary concern of the U.S. leaders has
inevitably reverted back to how the unrest affects U.S.
investment and financial interests. 19 For example, in a hearing
devoted specifically to achieving peace in this state, one
Congressman's prepared statement approached the crisis from
its impact on the United States and did not address the human
rights violations. 20 Congressman Ackerman explained, "The
U.S. reaction to the peso crisis demonstrates just how concerned
we are about instability, be it social, political, or economic, on
114. See Foreign Secretary, Congress Reject U.S. Pressures Over Chiapas
Situation, NOTIMEX NEWS AGENCY, June 19, 1998 (British Broadcasting
Corporation, trans.), LEXIS, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts.
115. See id.
116. See Official Denial That "Cooperation Programmes" Were Discussed With
USA, NOTIMEX NEWS AGENCY, Jan. 21, 1999 (British Broadcasting Corporation
trans.) LEXIS, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts.
117. See id. There is also a general consensus in the United States that the
federal government cannot involve itself in every conflict around the world. See Eric
Black, What Bush, Gore Think of Foreign Policy, Military, MPLS. STAR TRIB., Oct. 8,
2000, at A19. During the Presidential election, candidates Al Gore and George W.
Bush both agreed that the United States could not be interested in all foreign
hostility. President Bush has said that he will only engage troops if a conflict centers
on U.S. territory or valuable resources. See id.
118. See Conflict Resolution, supra note 64; Mexico: The Uprising in Chiapas
and Democratization in Mexico: Comm. On Foreign Affairs, H.R., 103rd Cong. (1994)
[hereinafter The Uprising in Chiapas].
119. See The Uprising in Chiapas, supra note 118.
120. See Conflict Resolution, supra note 64, at 21.
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our southern border."121
Skeptical observers of U.S. policy have noted that since the
adoption of NAFTA, some feel that the United States will do
almost anything to promote economic stability within Mexico. 122
For example, President Clinton helped arrange a fifty billion
dollar bailout of Mexico's economy in 1995 despite Congress'
disapproval. 23 This course of action drew sharp criticism. 24
While the loan money helped Mexico's faltering economy and
was eventually paid back,125 some have linked this enormous
sum of money to military attacks throughout Chiapas.126
In some circumstances, however, the world outside of
Mexico did respond to help the Zapatista supporters. 27
International demonstrations condemning the Mexican
military's actions prompted the January 12, 1994 cease-fire. 128
These protests took place around the world and included
Mexico's major trading partners, such as the United States,
Canada, Spain, and Germany. 29
One reason the Zapatistas receive support from outside
Mexico is because of the wide access to the details of their
struggle. The internet in particular plays a powerful role in
informing the world about Zapatista concerns. Information
comes directly from Chiapas, and unlike conflicts of the past,
the mainstream media is not the only source of information. 30
Marcos has made it a point to have his and his supporters' press
releases available on a web site titled Chiapas-L."31 His use of
the Internet to inform people around the world has been labeled
121. Id.
122. See S. Brian Willson, The Slippery Slope: U.S. Military Moves Into Mexico,
at http:! /www.nonviolence.org/archivedsites/slipperyslope/ (June 12, 1998).
123. See id. Once it was clear that Congress opposed this arrangement, Clinton
helped Mexico obtain loans from international funds, including the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). See id.
124. An estimated eighty percent of American citizens opposed the bailout. See
James M. Sheehan, Mexico Bailout Betrayal, HuMAN EVENTS, at http://rkba.org/
libretarian/cei/mexico-bailout.17feb95 (Feb. 17, 1995).
125. See Marina Jimenez, Zedillo Departs With His Reputation Assured, NAT'L
POST, Sept. 9, 2000, at A13.
126. See Willson, supra note 122 (suggesting that the bailout arrangement is
linked to agreements for the United States to provide training and supplies to the
Mexican military in Chiapas).
127. See WELLER, supra note 39, at 67.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 61-62.
131. See Paul Rich, NAFTA and Chiapas, 550 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 72, 73 n.2 (1997).
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clever, 132 but it is not the only thing he does to hold the world's
attention.
Another reason the outside world notices the Zapatistas is
their leader's attention-catching style. Marcos is typically seen
in a black ski mask smoking a pipe.133 He says that he will not
take off his ski mask until "Mexican society takes off its own
mask," 134 analogizing to contrast between the image Mexico
wants the world to see and the reality Marcos sees. 135 He
supposedly lives in the jungle with limited resources, yet the
former university professor keeps up to date on current events,
television, and movies. 136 Marcos also has a sense of humor, and
he has been known to tell political jokes when communicating
with the rest of the world. 137 His critics consider him a career
guerilla whose attempts to overthrow the Mexican government
are similar to Fidel Castro's actions in Cuba.138 His supporters,
however, have stood behind him since they began preparing for
their revolt in 1994.139
C. PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS DURING THE CHIAPAS UPRISING
Although Subcomandante Marcos has led the Zapatistas
throughout the struggle in Chiapas, leadership in Mexico has
undergone multiple changes. Throughout this period, Mexican
Presidents and their opponents have adopted varying strategies
to the problems in Chiapas and the related controversy
surrounding the adoption of NAFTA.
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari of the PRI party,
elected President in 1988, was the leader in 1994 during the
initial uprising in Chiapas. 140 While some criticize Salinas'
leadership, he has been credited with radically changing
Mexico's stance on international trade and turning Mexico into
132. See id. at 73.
133. See Michelle Ray Ortiz, Mexico and Marcos, LA REALIDAD, at http://
www.nettime.org/nettime.w3archive/199905/msgOO250.html (May 24, 1999); see
generally FIRST WORLD, HA HA HA!, supra note 22, at 56.
134. FIRST WORLD, HA HA HA!, supra note 22, at 70.
135. See id.
136. See Ortiz, supra note 133.
137. See id.
138. See Conflict Resolution, supra note 64, at 10-11.
139. See FIRST WORLD, HA HA HA!, supra note 22, at 65-67 (describing the
Zapatista preparations for the January 1, 1994 uprising).
140. See Goldman et al., supra note 42, at 101. In Mexico, Presidents are elected
for a six-year term, and they cannot run for re-election. See id.
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an active participant in the world market.14 ' While NAFTA is
the most prominent evidence of his willingness to reduce trade
barriers, 42 he also designed policies to encourage exports even
before this agreement. 43
Salina's efforts to expand Mexico's involvement in trade
received mixed reviews. While some felt that a reduction in
trade barriers would benefit some Mexicans, others feared the
negative effects of increased foreign investment.'4 In particular,
critics expressed concern over who would reap the benefits from
the emergence of new industries. 45 President Salinas' political
opponent, Cuahtemoc Cardenas, predicted negative
consequences. Before the Agreement's enactment, Cardenas
forecasted that the Agreement would eliminate subsistence
farming in rural areas, increase the disparity in wages among
Mexican workers, and be disastrous for the environment in
Mexico. 146
Salinas' successor, President Zedillo, was also a member of
the PRI party. Like President Salinas, President Zedillo
believed that globalization and involvement in international
trade would remedy poverty and inequality in Mexico. 147 The
Yale-educated economist left, office with the country
experiencing a fifteen percent economic growth rate and a
fifteen-year low in unemployment.'4 8 He is also credited with
electoral reform that lessened corruption involved in past
Mexican elections.' 49 Yet, not all of President Zedillo's endeavors
resulted in success. Zedillo began his term by launching a
military attack on the Zapatistas, and he continued with various
141. See id. at 101-02.
142. See id. at 121. NAFTA created an area where barriers to trade were
reduced between the United States, Canada, and Mexico. It did not create a common
market similar to the European Union. See id. President Fox has suggested an
alliance similar to the European Union for the United States, Canada, and Mexico,
however. See Richard Florida, Mexican Prosperity Would Help U.S., NEWSDAY, Sept.
11, 2000, at A29.
143. See Nash, supra note 30, at 367.
144. See If Not for NAFTA, When?, supra note 28, at 7. Since NAFTA, some
people have benefited from the doubling of exports and tripling of foreign investment
in Mexico, but other areas were not ready for the impact of NAFTA. See id.
145. See Nash, supra note 30, at 367-68. The export oriented economy led to new
industries. See id.
146. See id. at 368.
147. See Marina Jimenez, Zedillo Departs With His Reputation Assured, NAT'L
POST, Sept. 9, 2000, at A13.
148. See id.
149. See id.
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unsuccessful attempts at resolving the conflict in Chiapas. 150
II. A SIGNAL FOR CHANGE? THE ELECTION OF
PRESIDENT VINCENTE FOX
In December 2000, Mexico entered a new political era when
Vicente Fox took office as President.151 President Fox differs
significantly from a number of his predecessors. Most
significantly, his election marked the first time that a non-PRI
party President would lead Mexico in over seventy years. 15 2
Fox's reputation and experience, developed from a career in
business and industry,153 also signaled a shift from the fraud
and corruption that had plagued the PRI party. 54 Fox's past
experiences have guided him in his political career, and he is
quoted as saying, "politics is like retailing.., like selling
Coke." 55 After years in business, Fox first entered Mexican
politics with his candidacy for governor of Guanajuato in 1991,
but he did not win this seat until the 1995 election. 156 As
governor, Fox adopted the business analogy as political strategy,
treating citizens as "clients" who live in "market segments." 57
In 2000, Fox brought this attitude to the campaign trial, and
then, to the presidency.
During his campaign, Fox declared that he would solve the
situation in Chiapas in fifteen minutes. 58 Most were initially
cynical of this bold claim, including Marcos, who was reluctant
to believe Fox's promises to implement the San Andres accords
150. See supra Part I.B.2.
151. See id.; see also Nebbia & Martin, supra note 5.
152. See id. The PRI has a reputation of fraud and corruption, so on July 2,
2000, Mexican citizens took their dissatisfaction to voting booths and elected Fox of
the PAN party. See Boulet-Gercourt, supra note 46, at 7.
153. Fox, the former CEO of Coca-Cola of Mexico, rose through the corporation's
ranks from his initial job as a company salesman. See id. He left his job at Coca-Cola
to join a family business that exported vegetables and cowboy boots. See id.
154. See Boulet-Gercourt, supra, note 46, at 7.
155. Id.
156. See id.
157. See Rodrigo Vera, Fox's Corporate Style, PROCESO (Mexico City), July 9,
2000, reprinted in WORLD PRESS REV., Sept. 2000, at 10.
158. See Peter Fritsch, Chiapas Election Could Spur Talks With Guerrillas,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2000, at All. One of the ways President Fox hopes to solve the
problem is by making the 1996 San Andres Accords law. See Mercedes Olivera,
Chiapas Aims to Bolster Business Ties, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 30, 2000, at
34A. See also Gesell, supra note 87 and accompanying text (describing the benefits
of the San Andreas Accords for Chiapans).
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and to reduce military involvement in Chiapas. s59 Some,
however, felt that he would have a better chance of fulfilling his
promise should fellow PAN party candidate Pablo Salazar win
his bid to be governor of Chiapas. i60 Salazar also promised to
address the land rights issue and other concerns important to
the Zapatistas. 16' When Salazar was elected to this position in
late August 2000,162 and took office on December 8, 2000,163 an
opportunity for peace seemed at hand.
Fox's election brought optimism to the people who have
struggled at the hands of a corrupt government in the past. This
new leader promised change in Chiapas. Importantly, this may
be more than a politician making empty promises to gain re-
election. Fox was already elected when he made these
statements, and Mexican laws only permit one, six-year
presidential term.'6 In other words, Fox does not have to make
promises to please everyone in order to win reelection because
he is prohibited from running for this office again.1 65 Moreover,
Fox immediately took steps to fulfill his promise when he
scheduled negotiations with the Zapatistas and pulled some
troops out of the area shortly after taking office. 166
On the other hand, Presidents Salinas and Zedillo were in
office when they held numerous meaningless negations with the
Zapatistas and their supporters.167 Chiapans remember this,
and although a PAN party President brings the possibility of
change, the people struggling are not getting their hopes up.' 68
In fact, some report that genuine actions are needed to resolve
the problem, and that Fox's claim that he would end the conflict
159. See Jo Tuckman, Zapatistas Wait for Proof of New Mexican Order, THE
GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 24, 2000, at 16; but see Leader says Mexican rebels setting
armed struggle aside, Mpls Star Trib., March 25, 2001, at A13 (noting that Marcos is
adopting a new strategy and approach to negotiations in Mexico).
160. See Fritsch, supra note 158, at 34A.
161. See id.
162. See Opposition Win Boosts Hopes for Peace in Mexican State, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 22, 2000, at A22.
163. See Rebeca Rodriguez, Governor-elect of Chiapas Visits Area: Education
Stressed During Texas Trip, FORT WORTH STAR TELEGRAM, Sept. 30, 2000.
164. See Goldman et al., supra note 140.
165. See id.
166. See Weiner, supra note 102.
167. See generally supra Part I.B.2.
168. See Luis Herna'ndez Navarro, Will Fox Make a Difference For Chiapas?, LA
JORNADA, (Irlandesa trans.) at http://flag.blackened.net/revolt/mexico/reports/
fox-chiapasjul00html (July 25, 2000) (reporting that the communities in Chiapas
do not feel the optimism felt elsewhere).
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in fifteen minutes was "unfortunate and counterproductive." 169
A number of obstacles face Fox and in order to actually
bring about stability in this region, key changes will need to
occur. Unfortunately, for the citizens of Chiapas, Fox's
background and initial agenda indicate he is mostly concerned
with issues inconsistent with long-term resolution in Chiapas.
This section looks at Fox's focus on economic development in
Mexico and how it may undermine his claim to resolve the
situation in Chiapas. It then looks at how trade partners may or
may not influence a resolution of this conflict. Finally, it
suggests some steps that can be taken to end this ongoing
struggle.
A. CONCERNS IN CHIAPAS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Although President Fox said that he would quickly resolve
the Chiapas conflict, it has not been a key portion of his agenda.
Instead, Fox has prioritized his claim that he will "modernize"
his nation by expanding trade with the United States and
Canada beyond NAFTA.170 He also wants to "integrate" Mexican
children by teaching them to use computers, in English. 7' This
desire to "modernize" and "integrate" sounds similar to
President Salinas' desire to "pull Mexico out of the stagnation of
the third world and place it firmly in the realm of the first
world"' 72 when he was working on the passage of NAFTA.173 A
number of these proposals ignore the situation in Chiapas and
will cause only increased tension.
The Zapatista leader, Subcomandante Marcos, remains
skeptical of Fox's promise that he to solve Chiapas' problems
immediately upon taking office, 17 4 and for good reason. Many of
Marcos' worries involve Fox's career in business and
corporations. Fox was the leader of a multinational corporation
before he entered Mexican politics. 175 He also was tied to a
family endeavor that exported goods. 176 He understands how a
169. Id.
170. See Harry Sterling, Fox Must Remember His Two Nations, TORONTO STAR,
July 24, 2000, LEXIS.
171. See id.
172. Gutierrez, supra note 2, at 153.
173. See id.
174. See Tuckman, supra note 159; Mexico's President Orders Troops Out of
Rebel Areas, supra note 8.
175. See Nebbia & Martin, supra note 5.
176. See Boulet-Gercourt, supra note 46.
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company can grow and profit from investment and relationships
around the world. President Fox brings this mindset with him to
his new position, 177 and he is not shy about pushing his plan to
increase investment. Unfortunately, if Fox views Mexican
citizens as "clients" who belong to "market segments,"178 he will
likely focus his agenda on areas that can give him the most
economic return, and resolving the conflict in Chiapas will yield
less bottom-line profits than foreign investment.
Fox's focus on economic development and trade has led
some to suggest that the new President is concerned only with
the northern, industrial, and prosperous area of Mexico. They
note that optimistic predictions about trade assume that all
Mexican areas will feel the benefits from reduced barriers, and
this has not been the case for the people of Chiapas. While some
suggested that the adoption of NAFTA would benefit the
Chiapas region, with its fostering of investment and local jobs,
these benefits ultimately have not reached the people of
Chiapas.179 Along with increased investment and new jobs has
come increased competition, 80 and instead of gaining new,
better paying jobs, Chiapans have lost their established culture
and way of life.' 8 ' As a result, some accuse Fox of ignoring the
issues of the poverty-stricken people in the southern part of
Mexico.18 2 It has been recommended that he focus on uniting the
two very different regions of his own country before trying to
create agreements with other nations.'i 3
Similar difficulties result from Fox's desire to increase in
foreign investment in Mexico, i s4 which is at odds with his
promise to solve the problem in Chiapas. On President Fox's
visits to the United States and Canada in late August 2000, he
announced that he was eager to begin peace talks with the
Zapatistas, but qualified his statement by declaring the solution
to Mexico's problems could be solved by investment and a
177. Id.
178. See Vera, supra note 157.
179. . See Zabolski, supra note 55; Golman et. al, supra note 42.
180. See Gutierrez, supra note 66 and accompanying text.
181. See generally Kelly, Jr., supra note 34 and accompanying text (stating that
prior to the 1992 amendment to Article 27, there were three million families living
on ejidos).
182. See Sterling, supra note 170.
183. See id.
184. See Olivera, supra note 158 (explaining that Fox encouraged foreign
investment when he was governor of Guanajuato); see generally Zabolski, supra note
55 (describing Fox's recent trips to the United Staes and Canada to explain his
desire to reduce trade barriers).
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strengthened economy. 185
The situation of the Chiapan citizens will only get more
complicated if powerful foreign companies come into the area
and join the powerful Mexican citizens who are already reaping
profits at the expense of those who had legally recognized rights
to the land just eight years ago.18 6 Similarly, if Fox continues to
prioritize investment and economy over peace talks, problems
will only continue. Fox needs to take the advice of Mexican
scholars who have suggested there are two very different
factions within the country. 187 He must realize that, while
foreign investment may be a good decision for some regions
within the country, problems must be resolved in Chiapas before
outside interests complicate matters in this state. 88
Fox has also expressed a desire to open the U.S./Mexican
border further and to teach Mexican children to use a computer
in the English language. Again, these major items on Fox's
agenda ignore the situation in Chiapas. This state borders
Guatemala and is farthest from any benefit Mexican citizens
may receive from an open U.S./Mexican border. 189 In addition,
one of the last things on a child's mind who does not have
enough to eat, no running water to drink, and no access to
medicine or schooling, 190 is how to use a computer in English.
This child probably would consider it a luxury to be educated
even in her own language and has never seen a computer.191
While President Fox's goals may be beneficial for some, when
considered as a whole, they cast more doubt on his proclamation
185. See Mexico's Fox Looks to Improve Relations With Northern Neighbors,
CNN, at http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/americas/08/24/fox.us/ (Aug. 24,
2000).
186. The Chiapan citizens had rights to this land under Article 27 of the
Mexican Constitution. See CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS
MEXICANOS, art. 27, pt. X (amended 1967).
187. See Sterling, supra note 170.
188. See If Not For NAFTA, When?, supra note 28.
189. There are disagreements on whether opening the borders helps or hurts
Mexican citizens. See Kelly, Jr., supra note 55. When the benefits of NAFTA are
discussed, the negative impact of this agreement in areas like Chiapas is wholly
ignored. See generally Guterierrez, supra note 70 and accompanying text (quoting
Subcomandante Marco's concern about NAFTA's impact on Chiapas); Guuerrex,
supra note 75 and accompanying text (explaining that NAFTA did not address land
rights). To the extent any benefit exists from an open border, Chiapas is the furthest
area, geographically, from any benefit. See supra Part I.A. (stating that Chiapas is
the southernmost state in Mexico).
190. See supra notes 11-22 and accompanying text (discussing the extreme
poverty in Chiapas).
191. See FIRST WORLD, HA HA HA!, supra note 22.
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that he will immediately resolve the crisis in Chiapas.
Despite these warning signs regarding his agenda, Fox and
Chiapas governor Pablo Salazar started promoting their trade
and development policies to the United States and Canada
before they even took office. 192 In late August 2000, Fox went on
a four-day tour to talk about his plans to loosen trade barriers
further among the three countries. 193 He expressed a desire to
change U.S./Mexico border policy to allow Mexican workers to
send money more easily from one country to another. 194 He also
wants to eliminate tariff goods purchased by migrant workers
and to require a health insurance program for laborer's
relatives. 195
Although Fox expressed his desire to resolve the conflict in
Chiapas, he let his primary trade partners know that he felt
resolution in Chiapas would follow increased foreign investment
in Mexico. 196 While Fox met with U.S. officials, Governor
Salazar visited Texas to look for investors and "sustainable
development that won't affect the beauty of Chiapas." 197 He
emphasized the untapped, valuable resources in the area and
the construction of roads that would make it easier for investors
to travel to Chiapas. 198 Salazar suggested that U.S investors
could explore a market in Central America through investments
in Chiapas as well. 199 He also downplayed the conflict in the
area by assuring potential investors that the situation would be
resolved when the new leaders took office 200 and declaring that
the presence of the military made the area safe. 201
192. Leaders in the United States have been visiting Mexico to push for
increased trade as well. For Example, Minnesota's Governor Jesse Ventura visited
the more prosperous areas of Mexico in October, 2000 to promote investment in
Minnesota products. See Mike Meyers, Great Expectations, STAR TRIB., Oct. 22, 2000
at Al.
193. See Zabolski, supra note 55.
194. See Susan Ferriss, Fox Outlines Plan to Help Migrants, AUSTIN AMERICAN-
STATESMAN, Sept. 27, 2000, at A4.
195. See id.
196. See Mexico's Fox Looks to Improve Relations With Northern Neighbors,
supra note 185, at http: / / www.cnn.com /2000 / WORLD /americas / 08 /24 /fox.us /
(Aug. 24, 2000).
197. Olivera, supra note 158, at 34A. President Fox also encouraged Texas
investment in Mexico when he was the governor of Guanajuato. See David Sedeno,
New Chiapas Leader Seeks Ties to Texas, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 30, 2000, at
8A.
198. See Olivera, supra note 158.
199. See Sedeno, supra note 197.
200. See Rodriquez, supra note 162.
201. See Sedeno, supra note 197.
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A general critique involves the current state of the nation's
economy. The expanding Mexican economy may actually hinder
Fox's plans. Financial analysts say that the economy is growing
at an unhealthy rate, and President Fox will likely be forced to
decrease public spending to keep the country stable.20 2 This may
prove to be a challenge for the new President, as he is known as
"a big believer in development."203
B. TYING MEXICAN MODERNIZATION TO CHIAPAN STABILITY
While Fox's economic proposals may benefit parts of Mexico,
they will not bring resources, food, or stability to Chiapas.
Instead of economic development, the citizens of Chiapas want
their land back. 204 They want to be able to live as they choose,
without pressure from outsiders forcing them to gain short-term
profits at the expense of long-term land productivity. 20 5 As long
as their wishes are not directly addressed, the conflict in
Chiapas will continue to exist.
Fox has suggested that he would like to adopt the rejected
1996 San Andres Accords, 206 which would give Chiapans more
control over government funds allocated to them, involve
Chiapans in government decisions, and lead to constitutional
amendments securing Chiapans' land rights.207 However, the
reason this agreement was not permanently adopted in 1996
centered on disagreements regarding the increased autonomy
for Chiapans.208 President Fox is soliciting foreign investors to
enter Mexico, and any uncertainty regarding land rights or the
authority to govern this state will likely serve as a deterrent.
Again, President Fox's supposed agenda regarding Chiapas
seems less likely when considering his primary concerns of the
economy and investment. They are not, however, impossible to
reconcile.
President Fox did not resolve the conflict in Chiapas in
202. See Mexican President Elect Faces Key Decisions, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2000,
at 20.
203. Dolinsky, supra note 11.
204. See FIRST WORLD, HA HA HA!, supra note 22, at 64 (quoting
Subcommandante Marcos saying the Chiapans want their collective farms).
205. See id. Some argue that the plants that non-campesinos introduced to this
area destroyed the soil equilibrium for future planting, and that genetically
engineered seeds, hormones, and insecticides make it less feasible for Chiapans to
grow their crops. See id.
206. See Olivera, supra note 158.
207. See San Andres Accords, supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
208. See Conflict Resolution, supra note 64.
[Vol. 10:2
WILL FOX CHANGE CHIAPAS?
fifteen minutes, but there is still hope for this troubled state.
Fox is very caught up in fostering relationships with Mexico's
trade partners. For example, he wants to reduce barriers
further and create an alliance similar to the European Union
among the three countries who adopted NAFTA.209 In the past,
Mexico has been reluctant to accept outside input regarding
Chiapas,210 but with President Fox's agenda resting so heavily
on increased foreign relations, Mexico's trade partners may be
able to influence what happens in Chiapas. In addition, Fox has
different personality traits than the outgoing President
Zedillo211 and takes office in a different context,212 so outside
involvement is more likely.
1. Trade Partners Need to Understand the Real Problem
As mentioned previously, the root of this conflict centers on
land rights, and Mexico's trade partners need to understand this
before they can encourage a resolution. Once outside leaders
understand the underlying problem in Chiapas, they have
several options to influence a resolution.
Trade partners could condition their involvement in Fox's
trade plans on addressing the root of the problem in Chiapas.
While this approach seems the most likely to alter Mexico's
behavior, it contains many risks for the country's primary
trading partners. Should these countries condition their trade
relationships on Chiapas, they may lose the opportunity to
invest in this lucrative area. It will look as though concerned
foreign leaders are halting growth of domestic companies who
want to take advantage of this area rich in resources. This type
of action, however, is not unprecedented. The United States and
countries around the world address such horrible human rights
violations in other areas of the world.21 3 Considering how
important foreign trade and investment is to Fox, this course of
action may be the best chance that the Chiapan citizens have at
209. See Florida, supra note 142.
210. See Foreign Secretary, supra note 114.
211. Fox has been described as much more extroverted and colorful than
outgoing President Zedillo. See Jimenez, supra note 125.
212. When Zedillo took office, Mexico's economy was very unstable, and he was
not expected to accomplish much in this struggling state. See id. In contrast,
President Fox takes over a growing economy, and higher expectations may make
him subject to more outside pressure. See id.
213. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir. 1995) (using the Alien Tort
Claims Act to address human rights violations in Bosnia).
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resolution.
The trade partners could also take actions to stop this
conflict that have no direct impact on trade or investment. The
United States, for example, appears to have mechanisms to
address the human rights violations that are occurring in
Chiapas. 214 One way to address human rights violations that
occur in foreign countries is the Foreign Assistance Act codified
in 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (2000).215 Since it appears unlikely that the
United States and other Mexican trade partners will take an
active stance regarding Chiapas, they could at least stop
contributing to Mexico in areas where the support can be linked
to fostering discord in the state.216 It is troubling to think that
the United States would give aid to the Mexican military to help
them commit horrible human rights violations if the nature of
the conflict was understood.217 One hopes that they would not
allow massacres and tortures to take place using the aid they
provided without voicing disapproval of the situation and taking
remedial measures.
Congressional hearings indicate that the United States does
not understand what it must be like to have almost a century of
property rights erased,218 and its concentration on the United
States' own interests suggests that leaders will continue to
avoid looking further into this conflict. Members of Congress
talk around the real issues, but they are very caught up on how
this situation affects U.S. investors. 219 The United States
permits Senators and Representatives to serve more than one
term, so it is likely that these leaders will continue to have a
very narrow perspective and look at this conflict only from the
point of view of their own constituents.
214. Marcos has labeled the outsider's involvement in the area as genocide. See
Gutierrez, supra note 70 at 143. Marcos feels that NAFTA, which the United States
encouraged, led to many of the problems in Chiapas. See id. This "involvement" can
be contrasted with the passivity the United States and other countries have shown
after the 1994 uprising. See generally supra Part II.C. 1.
215. See supra note 112.
216. See Gutierrez, supra note 2.
217. See supra note 64. Since the Mexican government did not anticipate the
Zapatista uprising, the United States cannot be expected to have known its military
equipment would be used to violently attack the Chiapans. However, the United
States has recognized that its military training to halt narcotics could be used in
other contexts. See id. In addition, "low intensity" warfare, which involves
destroying buildings, crops, and water supplies is particularly harsh on Chiapans
and is taught at the United States' Army's School of the Americas in Fort Benning,
Georgia. See Wilson, supra note 122.
218. See Conflict Resolution, supra note 64.
219. See The Uprising in Chiapas, supra note 118.
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On the other hand, it is hard to believe that all
Congressional Representatives listening to Chiapan citizens and
Mexican scholars talking about the crisis in this area are unable
to understand what is really going on. Since the initial Zapatista
uprising, the United States House of Representatives
Subcommittee on International Relations and Subcommittee on
Foreign Affairs has held hearings specifically devoted to
Chiapas.220 It is likely that U.S. leaders know the issues and
they will not address them because, similar to options that
directly impact trade, in the short term a resolution will hurt
internal interests. For example, President George W. Bush was
the governor of Texas, where Fox and Salazar lobbied to
increase foreign investment.221 Bush would lose much needed
support from the powerful people in his home state if he
supported action that would restrict Texas companies'
investment in Chiapas. As mentioned previously, politicians
need short-term approval to keep their jobs.
2. Is It Realistic To Believe Trade Partners Will Help?
In the long term, all countries would benefit by demanding
resolution to this ongoing struggle. All countries could learn
from Chiapas when they face similar internal conflicts. The U.S.
may also see a decrease in illegal immigration, as people would
have rights to live on their own land and the means to survive
in Chiapas. 222 In addition, Mexico would be a more stable nation
for long-term growth in reality, instead of pretending to be
stable to meet outside approval. 223 The citizens of Chiapas would
have rights in the land they were promised long ago, and the
underlying problem would be addressed, allowing Chiapan
citizens to have a voice on what to do with this unique area full
of natural resources.
Unfortunately, long-term gain is at odds with how U.S.
politicians operate; this mentality will halt a resolution in
Chiapas. All possible courses of action lead to negative short-
term impacts locally. President George W. Bush does not want
to anger the people he represented as governor of Texas to
benefit a group of people suffering far away from Texas.
Minnesota is even further away from Chiapas, and Governor
220. See id. (citing two of these hearings).
221. See Olivera, supra note 158.
222. See Zabolski, supra note 55.
223. See Vargas, supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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Jesse Ventura would not want to upset his supporters by
severing a relationship that may prove beneficial to Minnesota
companies. 224
Chiapas has oil reserves, which will also affect the way
foreign trade partners handle this crisis. Oil is in high demand
around the world right now,225 and leaders would face
skepticism for shattering any opportunity to have access to this
resource.
In fact, when United States Presidential candidates Al Gore
and George W. Bush outlined their stance on U.S. military
involvement in foreign areas, both felt that the United States
could not involve itself in every conflict.226 Bush will only use
U.S. troops "to defend U.S. territory, allies or vital resources,
such as oil."227 If Bush raises U.S. access to oil resources to the
level of foreign attacks on U.S. territory, it is even more unlikely
that he would take a stand that would risk access to this
resource. Military involvement in Chiapas is not the answer to a
resolution, as fighting and the forcible taking of land would not
solve the root of the problem, but this stance on military
involvement helps illustrate the reluctance of U.S. leaders to get
involved in the Chiapas conflict.
C. STEPS TOWARD A SOLUTION
As proven by the failed attempts of past Mexican
Presidents, military involvement is not the solution to this
ongoing problem. However, there are some steps that need to be
taken by Fox, whether he is pushed from trade partners or he
seeks to resolve the conflict on his own initiative. Fox started his
term by pulling some troops out of Chiapas, 228 and he should
continue this course of action by reducing the military presence
in this southern state drastically. "It is tragic that so much
224. Ventura's trip to foster a trade relationship with Mexico made front page
news in Minneapolis on a day when the other top stories included the arrest of a
man accused of killing five family members, the ongoing battle with an out of control
wildfire just north of the Twin Cities area, and the Minnesota Vikings attempt to
become the National Football League's only undefeated football team in the eighth
week of the regular season. See generally STAR TRIB., Oct. 22, 2000 at Al and C12
(containing all of these stories).
225. See Clinton and Greenspan Express Concern Over High Crude Oil Prices,
supra note 12 and accompanying text.
226. See Black, supra note 117.
227. Id.
228. See Mexico's President Orders Troops Out of Zapatista Rebel Areas, supra
note 102 and accompanying text.
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costly military is being used to preserve such deep poverty."229 If
Fox stops spending such enormous amounts of money on the
military, he can take all of the money formerly spent on troops
in the area and use it for drinking water, medicine, and other
basic necessities.
Fox can also put an end to the PRI party "white elephants"
tradition that are signs of a past corrupt government. 230 An
observer has described white elephants as projects that "dot
Mexico like acne - useless, unwanted or unnecessary projects
that serve only as magnificent wastes of money and fountains of
corruption."2 1 Because it is felt that "they are planned without
considering the needs or opinions of the citizens who pay for
them,"232 eliminating white elephants would serve the dual
functions of stopping the unnecessary waste of money that is
needed elsewhere, and showing Chiapan citizens that this
leader is a change from the past.233 Fox needs to prove to the
Chiapan citizens that he is different from Salinas and Zedillo,
who made the same promises Fox is making.234 Not continuing
the "white elephant" tradition would be a good start.
Once Fox has made some initial changes in Chiapas that
would begin to remedy the problems and gain the Chiapans'
trust, he can start to directly address their concerns over land
rights. Fox and other Mexican leaders need to stop
concentrating on how foreign companies can reap the profits of
this state abundant in natural resources. If they start to focus
on the needs of the Chiapan citizens, leaders can work to meet
the needs of the people within the country rather than focusing
on getting extreme profits for those outside the country.
After Fox and other leaders, including Salazar, start
making progress in gaining the trust of the Chiapan citizens,
they may consider legal changes to achieve a more permanent
remedy the problem in Chiapas. Fox has expressed an interest
in reviving the San Andres Accords,235 and while adopting the
1996 agreement in its entirety seems improbable, 236 there are
parts to the agreement that would benefit Chiapas and Mexico
229. Wilson, supra note 122.
230. See supra note 15 (describing "white elephants").
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See Quinones, supra note 15 (explaining a recent Chiapan demonstration
expressing their dissatisfaction with such projects).
234. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
235. See Olivera, supra note 158.
236. See supra Part II.B.
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as a whole. The Chiapans would benefit if they had more input
into decisions directly affecting them, yet in the past the
Chiapans' input has not been considered.2 37 The initial Zapatista
uprising was spurred by the neglect these citizens felt, 238 and
increased involvement may ease some of this problem.
Fox could also initiate a re-evaluation the 1992 amendment
to Article 27, which eliminated ejidos in preparation for
NAFTA.239 The San Andres Accords call for a constitutional
amendment, but this may be a risky course of action. Frequently
changing this portion of the Constitution via amendment could
make the provision unstable. A new leader could be elected and
change this provision back if leaders view constitutional
amendment as an easy process to go through. In addition, all
people who have relied on both versions of Article 27 will be
reluctant to improve and work the land if it is felt their rights
can be taken away at any time. Mexico may benefit more in the
long run if Fox finds another way to ascertain Chiapan land
rights.
Perhaps, the Mexican government could define what the
change to Article 27 means in a way that is fair to the Chiapan
citizens. Redefining what a law means is seen in U.S.
constitutional jurisprudence, and this may be a course of action
could lead to a more equitable determination of who has legally
recognized land rights in Chiapas. However Mexico decides to
handle the Chiapas situation, to reach a resolution, land rights
issues need to be addressed.
CONCLUSION
It may not make political or economic sense for trade
partners to get involved in the Chiapas conflict. Mexico probably
does not want outsiders meddling in its internal affairs, and
trade partners risk huge investment opportunities if they try to
influence the outcome of a struggle affecting a small number of
people far away from their immediate concerns. The conflict in
Chiapas will not be solved unless Mexico and Fox get a push
from outside, however. Fox promises to resolve this seven-year
problem, but this promise is inconsistent with everything else
Fox plans to do while in office. Unfortunately for the people who
237. See Gutierrez, supra note 37 and accompanying text.
238. See id.
239. See If Not for NAFTA, When?, supra note 28.
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suffer and live under the control of the Mexican military, their
problems will not go away in the near future, despite Mexico's
change in leadership.

